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Universality is to be found primarily in the most inexhaustible of interpersonal
experiences and expressed under the sign of fraternity, itself a phenomenon of
uncommon richness.
Gabriel Marcel
A quarter half of a century has passed since Francis Fukuyama declared in The
End of History the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy. Contrary to this
prophecy, we are witnessing the sunset of the Western liberal international legal
order. It has been revealed in several critical momentathat liberal internationalism
has militant, interventionist character that causes paradoxical consequences of
‘illiberal liberalism’: in order to protect what a liberal State perceives as a liberal
regime, it ironically resorts to illiberal means that violate the same values it seeks
to protect. In the meantime, with the commitment to virtually universal formal
equality of State sovereignty, liberal internationalism domesticates issues of
substantive equalitypertaining todistributive justice. The structure of inequality
has been aggravated by a wide variety of managerial techniques elaborated for
implementing neoliberal policies. In studying the new form of power in neoliberalism,
Michel Foucault famously coined the term gouvernementalité, i.e. mentality of
government, that incrementally erodes the traditional power of sovereignty.
As a backlash against such liberal governmentality circumventing the equal
sovereignty of States, the contemporary world is witnessing the sunrise of Eastern
giants who envision an alternative to Western liberal order, with the Asian spirit
of brotherhood. Typically, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of
China jointly issued the 2016 Declaration on the Promotion of International Law,
which asserts an understanding of international legal order anchored in State
sovereignty. It is remarkable in this context that both Russia and China distinguish
rules governing their interactions with Western liberal powers from those regulating
their peripheries. Such an unequal treatment of the strong and the weak by the
hegemony may have an uncharted potential for universalising international law
under the community-oriented value of brotherhood, ‘the sign of fraternity, itself a
phenomenon of uncommon richness’ (see the opening words of Marcel).
Against those backdrops, this contribution intends to sketch the process in which
Asian countries have envisioned the shift ‘from (il-)liberal and (un-)equal to fraternal
international legal order’ (1). It does not aim to characterise the Eastphalian rise as
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the mere revival of the Westphalian sovereignty-based system; the author rather
argues that the East succeeds the other type of power developed in the Western
neoliberalism, i.e. governmentality (2).
1. Asian Ambitions for Fraternal International Legal Order
The struggle for the Eastphalian hegemony in the international legal order dates
back toJapan-led Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitoa Kyoeiken ####
##). Appealing to Asian liberation and brotherhood, Japanese leaders justified the
Great East Asian War as a holy war fought by Japan as the moral leader in this
region. Japanese international legal scholars responded to that ambitious project
by elaborating ‘Greater East Asian International Law’. For example, Kaoru Yasui,
referring to Carl Schmitt’s Großraum theory in international law, insisted that the
Eastern fraternal world as a ‘new order’ would be emancipated from Western liberal
world and its rules. Shigejiro Tabata conducted a nuanced historical analysis of
the formal equality of sovereignty that resulted in promoting de facto substantive
inequality among States. Despite theseacademic supportattempts for Japan’s
Daitoa Kyoeiken, that new regional order led suicidal destruction of the Empire
and collapsed with the end of the War (see historical analyses of pre-war and post-
war Japanese international legal scholarship by Yasuaki Onuma; and see also
excellent historiographies of Japanese theories by Yoshiro Matsui,Maki Nishiumi and
Josuke Ikeda).
The ambition of constructing a new international legal order has strayed around
theAsian region. In the contemporary era, the historical silk road recently
reincarnated by Chinais haunted by the uncanny ghost. Seemingly, the Belt
and Road Initiative, known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (yi dai yi lu ####),underpins
the absolutist notion of sovereign equality in upholding the 1954 Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence. Meanwhile, it is observed from the performative
perspective that Chinese do not view sovereignty exclusively through the absolutist-
relativist dichotomy but also have ‘post-relativist’ viewpoint to imagine the initiative
as an effort to recast international legal norms in China’s own image. It is notable in
this respect thatChina has caracterised itself as ‘brother’ of developing countriesin
helping themthrough infrastructure projects. Considering such a sign of blood-
tied relations, the Initiative may be labelled ‘a Confucian variant of neoliberalism’
that contains two constitutive elements: a continuation of economic neoliberalism
prevailed by US hegemony, and a Confucian (##) kinship model of China’s evolution
from a peripheral node to a core production zone.  
The fraternity-driven internationalism may also appear in Asian discourse of
international human rights. The sovereignty-oriented ‘Asian values’ debate, as
reflected in the Bangkok Declaration, famously reversed the hierarchy of first-
generation (civil and political) rights and second-generation (economic, social and
cultural) rights, with emphasising third-generation (collective) rights, particularly
the right to development. Through experiencing the financial and economic crisis
at the fin de siècle, even proponents of Asian values were forced to transform
their developmentalism or socialism centered on State sovereignty in accordance
with a liberal human rights conception. However, their prioritization of third-and
second-generation rights over first-generation rights was not totally casted away.
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In particular, the fraternal right to development retains the paramount status in the
Asian discourse of human rights protection (the National Human Rights Action Plan
of China (2016-2020); Articles 35–37 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration; Art.
II, Para. 2, Sub. xiiof the SAARC Social Charter).
1. A Chimera of the West and the East: Eastphalian Biopolitics
The foregoing features commonly indicate the Asian traditional preference to
the community-oriented value of brotherhood. To differentiate Japanese and
Chinese experiences, in contrast with the manifestly anti-liberal nature of Japan’s
Dai Toa Kyoei Ken in the past, China’s Belt and Road Initiative in progress is
equipped with Western innovative governmental techniques. From Foucault’s
analytical perspective, the governmental authority exerted by Beijing corresponds
to governmentality that rests on the capability of individuals to regulate their own
behaviour as efficient enterprises in compliance with market environment. In general,
governmentality is based upon its structural and legal constraints on sovereign
power, and therefore, leads to gradual erosion of sovereignty. The same may apply
to Chinese governmentalities by which, government is a much more decentred, ad
hoc and contingent affair.
It does not mean, however, that the sovereign power of government in China has
been replaced by neoliberal policies and techniques. We emphasise here that
China is adopting State neoliberalism, namely, elitist developmentalism jealously
sticking to State sovereignty even after its transformation through neoliberalism.
The biopolitical amalgam of sovereignty and governmentality becomes evident, for
example,in re-education camps in Xinjiang (##“New Frontier”), the ‘core hub’ of the
fraternal community of the Belt and Road Initiative. According to an Expert citing
credible sources in reviewing the report of China at theCommittee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination, China had turned the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
into something that resembled a massive internment camp shrouded in secrecy,
a ‘no rights zone’ in the name of combatting religious extremism and maintaining
social stability. In the famous formula by Giorgio Agamben, this concentration camp
typically represents inclusive exclusion: when sovereign biopower creates the state
of exception, what is taken outside (ex-capare) (an excluded fragmentary body: zoe),
is not absolutely without relation to the inside (an included political body: bios), but
maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension.
That said, what is the unique character of that chimera of the West and the East
that differentiates Eastern sovereign-governmental biopolitics from Western one?
The key element is the distinctive nature between liberty and fraternity, dealing
with equality in different manners. In the Western liberal world, especially in the
age of neoliberalism, the prevailing discourse presupposing ‘human rights limiting
sovereignty’ has privileged first generation rights by subordinating second generation
rights. The liberal biopolitics eroding sovereignty may be altered in terms of
community-based fraternity reflected in third generation rights: a Foucauldian
analysis sharply points out the governmental potential of second generations
rights, in tandem with third generations rights, through which the enhancement of
individual capacity becomes an important condition and end of collective economic
development. Nonetheless, as the author made a caveat, the biopolitical aspect of
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human rights becomes aggravated especially in Asian countries because neoliberal
governmentality rather reinforces sovereignty that has been continuingly obsessed
by developmentalism or socialism. The fraternal biopolitics consolidating sovereignty
may create an ironical circumstance of exclusive inclusion: the individuals included
to the society are always exposed to the risk of being excluded, by means of the very
socio-economic rights recognised to them, for the purpose of collective development.
It is notable in this point that Chinese authorities say the camps, which they call
training centers, offer free vocational training for Uighurs, Kazakhs and others,
mostly Muslims, as part of a plan to bring minorities into ‘a modern civilized’ world
and eliminate poverty in Xinjiang.
Concluding Remarks: (Criticising) Universality through Fraternity
This short piece concludes that the decline of the Western liberal world and the
symptom of Eastern fraternal world would not suggest a simple transition from
the former to the latter; they rather mutually reveal hidden agendas behind each
world’s value-order. Apart from this substantive point, this contribution took a unique
analytical perspective by juxtaposing sovereignty and governmentality in the West
and the East. It implied an emerging field, the author names comparative critical
international legal studies. Such a comparative method reveals analytical biases
covered with, and new research perspectives precluded by, Western critical insights
on international law, on the one hand; and it furthermore illuminates universal,
ubiquitous phenomena of the politics of international law by relativising the essential
characteristics of a multitude of power structure, on the other hand. This critical
portrayal of shedding light on both Western- and non-Western governmentalities, in
particular their aspect of biopolitics, is just an embryotic attempt for ‘Universality […]
in the most inexhaustible of interpersonal experiences’ (see the opening words of
Marcel).
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